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Psychologization or the discontents of psychoanalysis 
Abstract 
 
This article explores the possibility of a debate between psychoanalysis and the 
human sciences and, in particular, between psychoanalysis and psychology. Psy-
choanalysis’s particular view on subjectivity values fiction (truth having the struc-
ture of fiction) as a constitutive dimension of personal and social reality. In con-
trast, the mainstream psy-sciences threaten to remain caught in the attempt to 
unmask things as they really are (eg, hard neurobiological reality), thus risking 
losing the subjective dimension as such. Drawing on examples of phenomena of 
psychologization (in reality TV and in contemporary discourses of parent and 
child education) the author spells out the different, but eventually and necessarily 
intertwined, responses of psychoanalysis and psychology to modernity and mod-
ern subjectivity.  
 
Introduction: Fiction as Fiction  
Discussing literature and psychoanalysis, the philosopher De Kesel pleads for a presence 
for psychoanalysis in the cultural and scientific fields.1 He argues that it is high time to 
debate the grounding principles of the human sciences – and what exactly these are. He 
goes on that we are not far from the point where what we might understand as reality 
will be replaced by image culture, leaving no space whatsoever for approaches valuing 
the discursive dimension of human reality. De Kesel contends that we should strive to 
understand reality beyond the field of images, and, at the risk of sounding strange, he 
makes a plea for the recognition of fiction as fiction, a recognition that is taken seriously, 
he argues, only in the fields of psychoanalysis and literature. Such a recognition does 
                                                     
 
 
1 M. De Kesel, "Delphi revisited: Over literatuur en psychoanalyse," in Over de schreef – Psychoanalyse & 
Literatuur, ed. J. Houppermans (Amsterdam: Dutch University Press, 2005). 
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not occur in the field of psychology or in any of the myriad ways that psychology has 
extended itself into everyday life (which I refer to here as psychologization). 
The theoretical and practical field related to the psychological is not confined to par-
ticular sites of professional intervention but traverses the social itself.2 Precisely be-
cause of the ubiquity of what Ingleby and others refer to as the “psy-factor” and “psy-
matters” in terrains such as education, professional matters, and even politics, the cul-
tural, scientific and political stakes of any debate on the principles that ground psychol-
ogy and those which ground psychoanalysis are very high. Before I discuss what might 
be the terms of such a debate, unraveling the notion of fiction as fiction will help to eluci-
date the epistemological claims of psychoanalysis and those of the human sciences. 
Three central psychoanalytic principles guide us through this paper and help us to an-
swer what is perhaps the most crucial question of the debate: is such a debate even pos-
sible? As I discuss each psychoanalytic principle, I contrast it with the kinds of knowl-
edge claims found in the psy-sciences and disseminated more broadly throughout the 
contemporary social world. My examples of the latter are drawn from reality-TV as well 
as from contemporary discourses of parent and child education. 
The first psychoanalytic principle to be explored is that truth has the structure of fic-
tion. It is clear that both literature and psychoanalysis consider fiction as a substantial 
and constitutional dimension of human and social reality. In Lacanian psychoanalysis 
language is attributed a central role in the experience both of the self and of reality, and 
here fiction necessarily enters the field. As Jacques-Alain Miller puts it, central to the 
psychoanalytic perspective is that the mere fact that one speaks always already trans-
forms what is into a fiction.3 Speaking as such means that reality is necessarily discursive 
and, thus, necessarily fictional. Therefore, Lacan’s well-known axiom that the “truth has 
the structure of fiction”4 should not be misconstrued as suggesting that beneath the 
discursive layer the actual state of affairs or some bedrock of the real could be laid bare. 
In this respect Alenka Zupančič writes that it is exactly the trope of ‘fiction-within-
fiction’ (the story within the story) which exposes “the moment where fiction is faced 
with its own exterior at its interior.”5 
So fiction as fiction means that it is only within the interior of fiction itself that 
something of the (always exterior) truth is given form. Think of Levi-Strauss’s analysis, 
                                                     
 
 
2 See: D. Ingleby, "The ambivalence of psychoanalysis." 
3 J. A. Miller, "A contribution of the schizophrenic to the psychoanalytic clinic," Symptom 2(2002), 
http://www.lacan.com/contributionf.htm. 
4 J. Lacan, Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959–1960, ed. J. A. Miller, trans. D. Porter (London: Routledge, 
1992), 12. 
5 A. Zupančič, "A perfect place to die: Theatre in Hitchcock’s films," in Everything You Always Wanted to Know 
about Lacan but Were Afraid to Ask Hitchcock, ed. S. Žižek (London: Verso, 1992), 82. 
 discussed by Žižek, of how in the Winnebago tribe the spatial disposition of the build-
ings of the village is experienced differently by the tribe’s two subgroups.6 Both groups 
perceive the village as a circle but, whereas for one subgroup there is within this circle 
another circle of central houses, the other subgroup describes the ground-plan in terms 
of a dividing line splitting the village down the middle. Žižek stresses that Levi- Strauss’s 
example should in no way entice us into cultural relativism, a stance that would boil 
down to viewing the two ‘relatively’ different accounts as distortions of an objective and 
actual layout of the buildings. Rather, what is in play here is a hidden; traumatic kernel,’ 
as Žižek puts it, a social antagonism that points to the structural impossibility of the 
community’s maintaining itself as a harmonious unity. This social antagonism distorts 
the tribe members’ view of the actual arrangement of the houses.7 Thus, the differences 
in the perception of the village ground-plan is the truth of the social antagonism, which 
cannot but constitute itself through fictional articulations. 
We come now to the second psychoanalytic principle contained in fiction as fiction: re-
flexivity. Psychoanalysis as such is alien to the simple reflective scheme of ‘look at your-
self; this is the reality behind your illusions’. Concerning the Winnebago village, a psy-
choanalytic stance does not envisage a reflective confrontation of the villagers with 
their mythical distortions of the actual ground plan. In contrast, the psychoanalytical 
principle is reflexivity, as it testifies to an essential asymmetry, exemplified here in the 
social antagonism contained in the two architectural accounts of the villagers. Psycho-
analysis envisions the paradoxical reflexive movement itself. Or, as De Kesel argues con-
cerning literature, if a novel or a poem can fundamentally touch us, it is because it can 
show us who we are, not directly, but in a sphinxlike enigmatic question.8 While reflec-
tion presupposes a unified agent looking at itself as the (neuro)psychological being it is 
said to be, reflexivity returns us to ourselves as an enigma. The inward -looking subject 
always at some point suddenly meets his own gaze. For Lacan, as Felman argues, Freud’s 
inaugural step was precisely to move away from the classical psychological and philoso-
phical epistemology of self-identity: psychoanalysis’s unprecedented mode of reflexivity 
necessarily incorporates a passage through the Other, not as a reflection of the self but 
as a radical difference from the self.9 The subject, passing through the Other, “returns to 
itself without quite being able to rejoin itself.”10 Reflexivity is untotalizable, producing a 
                                                     
 
 
6 S. Žižek, The Parallax View. 
7 Ibid., 25–26. 
8 M. De Kesel, "Delphi revisited: Over literatuur en psychoanalyse." 
9 S. Felman, "The Originality of Jacques Lacan," Poetics Today 2, no. 1b (1980). 
10 Ibid., 51. 
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fundamental ignorance of the subject.11 This brings us to the next psychoanalytic prin-
ciple, as it is exactly this ignorance, this lack, that is constitutive of subjectivity. 
The third central principle can be inferred from De Kesel’s argument that the task of 
psychoanalysis is to reintroduce the conception of subjectivity precisely by opposing 
knowledge to the dimension of truth: truth as “the blind ground upon which knowledge 
rests.”12 De Kesel claims that, whenever today’s naive scientism unconditionally claims 
the solidity of established knowledge, the subject is banished. The psychoanalytic prin-
ciple of fiction as fiction, in contrast, values the place and the momentum of the crack 
within the firmness of knowledge. Just consider the importance of the lapsus (slip of the 
tongue), the dream and the symptom: they are for psychoanalysis the very places where 
the subject appears. Thus, this subjective space/moment is always also a non-
space/moment. The subject cannot but claim subjectivity from a blind point beyond its 
subjectivity, beyond all possible reflective knowledge of itself. By referring to Oedipus, 
De Kesel illustrates this ‘blind ground upon which knowledge rests’ as constitutive of 
subjectivity. Oedipus is the tragic figure for whom knowledge (the prediction that he 
will kill his father and sleep with his mother) functions exactly as a blind spot. Oedipus 
becomes the subject – the bearer – of this knowledge only when it explodes in his face as 
a horrible truth. That is the moment Oedipus understands that, by trying to outrun his 
fate, he has realised it. For psychoanalysis, there is an intricate bond among knowledge, 
blindness and truth: 
In the end, the blind spot is our ‘bearer’, our ‘subject’. Psychoanalytic theory 
wants to be a knowledge that acknowledges that blindness without wanting to 
erase it, a knowledge that in a conscious way is built on the irreducibility of this 
blind un-knowledge.13 
If these are the principles of a psychoanalytic view of subjectivity, the question we must 
grapple with is, will the proposed debate between psychoanalysis and the human sci-
ences not falter on psychoanalysis’ particular view of truth and knowledge? Where psy-
chology supposes an axis of knowledge–nonknowledge, psychoanalysis’ peculiar stance 
is to situate subjectivity on the axis knowledge– unknowledge. Thus, where dominant 
contemporary views on human nature claim the hard knowledge of, for example, the 
neurobiological substrate, considering this knowledge useful and even emancipatory, 
the three psychoanalytic principles subvert this claim or at least put it into question. 
                                                     
 
 
11 Ibid. 
12 M. De Kesel, "Delphi revisited: Over literatuur en psychoanalyse," 76, my translation. 
13 Ibid., 76, my translation. 
 Starting from the principle of a blind unknowledge, the fundamental critique on the 
psysciences might be that they are not up to the task of taking subjectivity seriously.  
To clarify, let me spell out the different, but eventually and necessarily intertwined, 
responses of psychoanalysis and psychology to modernity and modern subjectivity. 
Modernity is characterized by a structural shift in the place of knowledge, in the way 
human beings experience the truth of the world, of others and of themselves. One can 
argue that the massive objectivations of the modern sciences decisively changed subjec-
tivity as human beings and their lifeworld came almost completely if not totally under 
the jurisdiction of Academia. No longer grounded in mythology or religion, the riddle of 
subjectivity became the question of, in the words of Giorgio Agamben, what does it 
mean to be subject to desubjectivation?14 Put differently, what does it mean to be a hu-
man being in a world of forces, synaptic exchanges and evolutionary patterns? Psychol-
ogy, whose ambition is to be the keystone of the project of the modern sciences, is one 
attempt to deal with modern subjectivity. Psychoanalysis is another one. Or is it not? 
The following sections scrutinize the three psychoanalytic principles in light of what 
De Kesel calls the rise of image culture within the cultural and scientific fields.15 Each 
section is guided by two phenomena by which psychology thoroughly permeates every-
day life. The first is the phenomenon of psychotainment. Although De Kesel puts for-
ward literature as a site where subjectivity is at stake,16 Reality TV as psycho-television 
seems a more contemporary locus of the fictionalization and staging of postmodern 
man’s psychology and subjectivity. The second set of examples comes from discourses 
about parenting and education, not only important topics on Reality TV, but, in general, 
crucial fields to be considered in the proposed debate. These two examples do not 
merely concern the cultural application of the psy-sciences. Psychologization is far from 
just being the unhappy overflow of the psy-sciences into the social. Indeed, the exam-
ples reveal the very epistemic paradoxes of the psy-sciences, and, more crucially, they 
lay bare the ontological deadlocks constitutive of modern subjectivity as such. That the 
psy-complex – defined by Ingleby as an ensemble of agencies traversing the family, 
school, work place and thus the social itself17 – plays a leading role in the folding of sci-
ence into the cultural sphere (as in a Moebius band), should prompt psychoanalysis to 
initiate the almost absent debate. 
                                                     
 
 
14 G. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz (New York: Zone books, 2002), 142. 
15 M. De Kesel, "Delphi revisited: Over literatuur en psychoanalyse." 
16 Ibid. 
17 D. Ingleby, "The ambivalence of psychoanalysis," 43. 
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Truth Structured as Fiction Versus the Image Culture Within the Mainstream Psy-sciences 
De Kesel argues that where the psychoanalytic stance of fiction as fiction is rejected, im-
age culture takes over, for if fiction is denied its central role in the constitution of sub-
jectivity, the image instead is regarded as the place of the truth.18 In other words, it is 
precisely where one claims to go beyond discursive construction to the ‘bare facts’ that 
one will encounter the manifestations of the imaginary and the fantasmatic. Or, to put it 
in terms of the Lacanian trinity,19 when one attempts to bypass the Symbolic to reach 
the unmediated Real, one will necessarily succumb to the mirages of the Imaginary. Psy-
chotainment shows on television are a telling example of how the denial of fiction as fic-
tion opens up the field of the imaginary. Take, for example, programmes on educational 
problems where therapists are linked to parents with a radio device so as to provide 
support and advice in real time. Shows like Little Angels (BBC3 in the UK) and Schatjes (EO 
in the Netherlands) present us with therapists who, while following the parent–child 
interactions on a little monitor, correct inadequate parental behaviour by whispering 
the right lines in the parent’s ear. Supporters of educational television say that these 
programmes successfully provide parents with “specific information and an accurate 
model that would enable them to put suggested strategies into practice.”20 
This kind of empowerment of the parent role should be taken very literally. When 
there is a role to play, this can only mean that there is a script, one that is laid down in 
the scientific knowledge of the psy-theories. Here we are very close to a fictionalization, 
if not a virtualization, of reality. It is important to see that this format is employed not 
only for educational television but also for many mainstream psycho-educational and 
therapeutic practices. The therapist here is the prompter and director, acting on behalf 
of ‘science’; the therapist provides us with ‘effective strategies’ and ‘accurate models’ to 
ensure that we have our lines right. For Sanders et al, who champion parenting televi-
sion, the mass media are the via regia to making as many parents as possible acquainted 
with “a general understanding of social learning theories.”21 Sanders and colleagues fur-
thermore contend that, for mass media parenting programmes to be effective, they 
have to get parents “to adopt a self-regulatory process that involve[s] self-
monitoring.”22  
                                                     
 
 
18 M. De Kesel, "Delphi revisited: Over literatuur en psychoanalyse." 
19 J. Lacan, "Le séminaire Livre XXII: R.S.I., 1974-1975," Ornicar, no. 2, 3, 4 & 5 (1975). 
20 M. R. Sanders, D. T. Montgomery, and M. L. Brechman-Toussaint, "The mass media and the prevention of 
child behavior problems: the evaluation of a television series to promote positive outcomes for parents and 
their children," The Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines 41, no. 7 (2000): 940. 
21 Ibid., 945. 
22 Ibid., 940. 
  If psychoanalysis wants to debate the assumptions of the psy-complex regarding 
subjectivity, it will have to contend with the far-reaching tendencies of psychologiza-
tion. It will have to confront the way the omnipresent psy-sciences suffocate the dimen-
sion of fiction as fiction by suffusing social reality not only with signifiers but, above all, 
with discursive schemes assigning subject positions and scripting the interactions. In-
deed, despite the claim for academic diversity, the theories and strategies of today’s 
psy-complex are informed by an increasingly narrow range of models (foremost being 
cognitive-behavioural, neurobiological and evolutionary thinking). As Hendrick re-
marks, there is a fundamental mismatch between the new, and potentially liberating, 
academic approaches to conceptions of childhood – for example, the promotion of de-
mocratisation in the family and participation in education – and the actual practices of 
children’s lives and relevant government policies.23 Regarding these policies, consider, 
for instance, the professionalization of many of the care-professions,24 which brings 
with it a heightened presence of psy-theories, not only in the curricula but also in eve-
ryday praxis. Psychologization thus also seems to be an official policy. In Flanders, for 
example, the government explicitly promotes the Triple P-method,25 a typical CBT 
(Cognitive Behavioural Therapy) approach, as the key method for parenting support 
programmes. Official policy holds that every urbanized area should have its Triple P 
‘parenting support shop’ (sic). In this way the psy-apparatus seems to have become just 
as omnipresent as the ecclesiastical apparatus was in the past,26 and, although it may 
lack its central papal authority, it is nonetheless powered by a strongly uniform psy-
chologising discourse.  
The similarities between the psy-apparatus and the once omnipresent church might 
also be seen from another perspective. Is there not a parallel between the low estima-
tion put on earthly life by Christian doctrine and human sciences’ battle against what 
we might call random life? Just as Freud criticized religion for devaluing earthly life in 
favour of pious life and, above all, the afterlife,27 so too does the psy-complex attempt to 
get rid of plain and unsophisticated earthly life. For example, the Flemish minister of 
                                                     
 
 
23 H. Hendrick, "Optimism and Hope versus Anxiety and Narcissism: Some Thoughts on Children’s Welfare 
Yesterday and Today," History of Education 36, no. 6 (2007): 747. 
24 E.g. early childcare; see: J. Peeters, The construction of a new profession: A European perspective on professionalism 
in Early Childhood Education and Care (Amsterdam: SWP Publishers, 2008). 
25 M. R. Sanders, "Triple P-Positive Parenting Program: Towards an empirically validated multilevel parenting 
and family support strategy for the prevention of behavior and emotional problems in children," Clinical Child 
and Family Psychology Review 2, no. 2 (1999). 
26 J. De Vos, "Psychologisation: Psychoanalysis' (Double) Political Appointment with History, The Accoyer 
Amendment Revisited." 
27 S. Freud, "Civilization and its discontents," in The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund 
Freud: vol. XXI, ed. J. Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, [1930a]1955), 84. 
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education once pleaded for better sex education; he contended that the fact that there 
are still girls who blush when the subject is brought up in class means that there are still 
taboos to be tackled.28 To blush with shame warrants an educational if not therapeutic 
intervention. Mainstream psychology’s aim is to get rid of every antagonism. The sub-
jective reasons why someone would blush – which could be expressed only in a discur-
sive and thus fictional account – are promptly set aside to promote an imaginary ideal 
image of sexual maturity. Similarly we find today a strange uneasiness or even disdain 
for any awkwardness, triteness or everyday clumsiness about bullying, multicultural-
ism, gender problems and the like. The manifold psycho-pedagogical programmes in 
schools and elsewhere virulently want to abolish the redundant subjective element and 
its fictional idiosyncrasies. Teachers are, for example, prompted to use the educational 
mourning box when a pupil is confronted with the death of a relative.29 No more awk-
ward, random reactions, only those allowed by the mourning box code.  
 To summarize, mainstream psychology threatens to script, virtualise and hence suf-
focate subjectivity, and this is what unites today’s psychotainment with today’s actual 
psycho-social practices. However, if we want to defend the notion of truth structured as 
fiction, must we not still go one step further and acknowledge that psychoanalysis too 
plays its part in feeding image culture, that is has its own version of psychotainment, 
which has (or has had) an equally important influence on constructing subjectivities? 
Yes, perhaps, but the dramatic imagery of Freudian psychoanalysis (grand hysteria, in-
cest, castration) is still quite different from contemporary psychology’s promotion of a 
flattened self,30 defined by its molecular forces, behavioural patterns and evolutionary 
logics. Is, then, the stake of the debate the choice between, on one hand, the rather shal-
low image culture of the mainstream psy-sciences as it is exemplified in Reality TV and, 
on the other hand, the flamboyant imagery of psychoanalysis?  
Put differently, the choice is one between psychotainment, and Hitchcock, to take a 
paradigmatic example of psychoanalytic psychotainment. One can claim, however, that the 
alternatives are not equivalent. Hitchcock’s very obvious Freudian world is far removed 
from Reality TV’s construction of reality using textbook psychology scripts. Hitchcock 
can be said to remain within the structure of fiction as fiction: he fictionalizes psychoana-
lytic imagery, and in this movement he does more than just illustrate psychoanalysis. 
Hitchcock’s characters are not illustrations of psychoanalytic theory; they are always 
                                                     
 
 
28 L. Jonckheere, "Problemen bij de 'implementatie' van het decreet betreffende de Integrale Kwaliteitszorg in 
de Verzorgings- en Welzijnsvoorzieningen," Verslag van de Conversatie van de Kring voor Psychoanalyse van de New 
Lacanian School(2004), http://www.forumpsy.org/be/conversatie.resume.htm. 
29 E. Verliefde et al., A World Full of Comfort: A Play Set for Children from 5 to 12 for Working on Losses (Leuven: CEGO, 
2006). 
30 N. Rose, "Psychology as a Social Science," 460. 
 subjectivized at some odd point, a point jenseits or beyond Freud. Žižek calls this the 
Hitchcockian sinthom(e):  
[T]he birds do not ‘signify,’ they do not ‘symbolize’ blocked sexual relations, the 
‘possessive’ mother, and so on; they are, rather, the making present in the real, 
the objectivization, the incarnation of the fact that, on the symbolizing level, 
something ‘has not worked out’, in short, the objectivization-positivization of a 
failed symbolization.31  
This so-called Hitchcockian stain is that certain something in the cinematic écriture and 
thus outside the script that creates the typical Hitchcock suspense. These are moments 
when the flow of the psychology of the characters or the plot in general is disrupted so 
as to let the dimension of subjectivity in. Fiction is thus as such an important field of 
praxis of psychoanalysis – informing psychoanalysis and being informed by psycho-
analysis – influencing importantly the shaping of subjectivities. But where psychoanaly-
sis operationalizes fiction as fiction, it finds itself on ground very different from that of 
the mainstream psy-sciences.  
Reflexivity Versus the (Meta)Reflectivity of the Psy-sciences  
The next psychoanalytic principle we have to situate within the cultural and scientific 
field is reflexivity. As we look at today’s really existing sociopsychological practices, it is 
clear that not reflexivity but reflectivity is the dominant paradigm. Reflectivity departs 
from an unproblematized symmetry between, on one hand, a totalizable and unified 
individual, and, on the other, an equally unified and clear-cut reality of the social or the 
self on which to reflect. When De Kesel critiques today’s naive scientism, which uncon-
ditionally claims the solidity of established knowledge, he also questions scientism’s 
claim that it can attain a full and undistorted reflective picture of the social world and 
human beings.32 Again, Reality TV showcases this claim in an intensified form: just con-
sider the slogan, the human condition laid bare of Zone Reality (a UK TV channel showing 
only reality programming) or the promotional catch-phrase of Reality TV in Flanders’s 
life as it is.  
How paradoxical this hunger for authentic life is becomes rapidly clear in main-
stream conceptions of authenticity. For example, when Wright writes that “a sense of 
                                                     
 
 
31 S. Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture: 104. 
32 M. De Kesel, "Delphi revisited: Over literatuur en psychoanalyse." 
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authenticity is one of our deepest psychological needs,”33 she unwittingly testifies to the 
tautological character of reflectivity and its quest for authenticity, as she operational-
izes authenticity as one of our most authentic needs. As Žižek says of those who preach 
the rediscovery of our true Self, their very style of repeating like an automaton the 
learned phrases contradicts their message.34 This paradoxical injunction of self-
reflection invokes religious imagery: the psy-expert who summons us to get in touch 
with our real feelings and our genuine selves seems to evoke the same feelings of super-
ego guilt as those evoked by the priest. Consider also how Pupavac, speaking of Princess 
Diana’s death, describes how therapeutic forms have taken the place of religious cere-
monies as the predominant mode of performing cultural rites.35 But here it is important 
not to miss the shift in reflectivity: it is clear that the participants in such psychologised 
rites are directly familiar with the body of knowledge in play. Interviewing a participant 
would generate the same signifiers and analysis proclaimed in the media by the psy-
experts.  
A closer look at the epistemology of self-reflection and its illusory principle of sym-
metry between the reflecting self and the self reflected on might help us to understand 
why religious imagery imposes itself so readily in these late-modern phenomena of psy-
chologization. Let us depart from Vande Veire’s analysis of how the Christian paradigm 
still pervades the Western media.36 Drawing on Derrida, Vande Veire argues that relig-
ion is centred on the sacred, the absolute and the unassailable. In pagan cults sacrifices 
are demanded so as to secure this inaccessible sacredness of life. The sacrifice is the 
price one has to pay to gain access to the sacred, through a kind of ritualized profana-
tion of the sacred. In Christianity, however, divine life no longer needs sacrifices: God 
has already made the ultimate sacrifice, which renders all human sacrifices irrelevant. 
Through his son, God has redeemed humanity. Although Christian civilisation needs no 
further sacrifices, Christians can restrict themselves to the regular invocation of Christ’s 
sacrifice and spread the good news.  
According to Vande Veire, this is the fundamental paradigm of Western culture. He 
analyses how the Christian paradigm, for example, thoroughly determines the daily TV-
news. TV news anchor-persons represent redeemed humanity. They are calm, reason-
able and sensible. In short, they represent the ideal witness of world events. From this 
redeemed position, they seem to be able to oversee the whole world; a fragmented and 
                                                     
 
 
33 K. Wright, "Dare to be yourself," Psychology Today Magazine, no. May/June (2008), 
http://psychologytoday.com/articles/pto-20080420-000001.xml. 
34 S. Žižek, The art of the ridiculous sublime: on David Lynch's Lost highway. 
35 V. Pupavac, "Psychosocial interventions and the demoralization of humanitarianism," Journal of Biosocial 
Science 36, no. 04 (2004). 
36 F. Vande Veire, Neem en eet, dit is je lichaam. 
 dispersed world is brought to unity in the gaze of the TV news. The anchor-person, as it 
were, totalizes reality. In this way the spectator, identifying with the news anchor-
person, also becomes an external witness of the world, empathizing and sympathizing 
with the whole of humanity. Dismayed, yet reserved, the news anchor-person and the 
viewer together reflect on how a part of humanity still has not understood the message 
of peace and reconciliation; they understand that the mission has not yet ended.  
Here it is not difficult to transpose Vande Veire’s analysis of reflectivity in the media 
to an analysis of the psy-complex. The psy-practitioner resembles the newscaster in his 
role as the sober, reserved but committed outsider, the one who bears liberating knowl-
edge and yet is free from his own symptoms. The readymade role for both the news-
caster and the psy-expert is that of the somehow detached, lucid and authentic person 
who is fully present with himself or herself. Furthermore, from their privileged external 
position, both newscaster and psy-expert claim to provide a total assessment of the 
world. Television presents the illusion of covering events completely, whereas psychol-
ogy claims to fathom human beings in all their aspects. Psychology and the mass media 
are the heirs both of God’s omniscient eye and of Bentham’s Panopticon, providing the 
experience of unity and affinity with oneself and the world.  
As we turn to the educational and parenting sphere, this omniscient reflective stance 
is clearly demonstrated in claims such as the one on the official website of Triple P, the 
CBT-educational method mentioned earlier:  
We have the knowledge and evidence base to prove that Triple P works for many 
different families, in many different circumstances, with many different problems, 
in many different places!... Triple P … helps solve current parenting problems and 
prevents future problems before they arise.37  
Not surprisingly, Triple P was the direct theoretical resource for British commercial 
telesion broadcaster ITV’s parenting programme Driving Mum and Dad Mad.  
It is important to recognize that psychotainment is not the result of an all-devouring 
media machine; nor is it a product of the unfortunate popularization and marketing of 
psychology. Rather, its popularity suggests that the paradigms of psychology occupy a 
central place in late-modern experience and that these paradigms are to be understood 
within the epistemology of reflectivity. The most crucial point here is, then, to grasp 
how in reflectivity the necessary passage through a corpus of knowledge – in Lacanian 
terms, through the Other – is structurally obfuscated. If a medium is a representation ap-
paratus,38 then psychology is one of today’s most important media. It is this fact, that 
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psychology is a mediator rather than a science of behaviour, that must remain con-
cealed. Notwithstanding that psy-knowledge plays a central role in making contempo-
rary life intelligible and malleable, the decisive mediation of this corpus of knowledge is 
not acknowledged, as it is believed that the hard bedrock of the real is laid bare. Just 
consider how, for a medium obsessed with the reality behind the illusion, the psy-
discourse becomes the central framework for revealing the man behind the politician, the 
man behind the pop-star, the man behind the journalist, and, finally, the man behind the psy-
chologist. Here, however, mainstream psychology’s reflectivity cannot but lead to para-
doxes and tautologies. The aforementioned Wright, for example, writes, “Self-awareness 
encompasses an inventory of issues from the sublime to the profane, from knowing 
what food you like to how likely you are to quit smoking to whether you’re feeling anx-
ious or sad.”39  
The supposedly unmediated authenticity turns out to be knowledge-mediated. The au-
thentic person is supposed to be able to monitor his or her preferences, inclinations and 
feelings. Prompted to turn the psychological gaze upon ourselves, we are all called on to 
become our own psychologists.  
But am I going too fast? Am I not neglecting how in contemporary praxis the place of 
knowledge is acknowledged and reflectivity has been traded in for a kind of meta-
reflectivity? To return to the TV-news, consider, for example, how during a press con-
ference the camera will often show other cameras and journalists at work, creating the 
illusion that the postmodern press actually lays bare and deconstructs its own produc-
tion process. Similarly, the postmodern relativistic stance is realized in mainstream 
psychologists’ claim not to be in possession of the whole truth, their laying bare of their 
method and their prompting clients to be their own experts. Often this be-your-own-
expert stance results in paradoxical double-bind situations, as, for example, on the Triple 
P website, where you can read “kids don’t come with an instruction manual” and “par-
enting now comes with an instruction manual.”40 Or: of course you are the expert, but we 
psychologists are the experts in letting you know.  
In this way, both the media’s and psychology’s claim that they deconstruct their own 
discourse and position might actually be the ultimate fictionalizing of reality. In the 
faux deconstruction, the expert only masks his power and authority. The process of un-
veiling, therefore, does not alter anything. It does not liberate people but reconfirms 
their mediated, psychologized position as the almost redeemed spectators of the world 
and of themselves. Or, put differently: the reflective move does not empower since it 
reinforces the hegemonic discursive schemes and signifiers. The deconstructionist twist 
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 thus only reaffirms the media and psychology in their function of making postmodern 
man experience himself, his environment and his historical moment as positive and 
significant. Stepping out of the medium is the medium itself.  
On the other hand, if psychoanalysis pleads for the Freudian shift from reflectivity to 
reflexivity, then it is essential that, in the passage from the self to the self, what is re-
turned to the self from the Other is, paradoxically, as Felman puts it, “the ignorance or 
the forgetfulness of its own message.”41 To grasp this notion, Vande Veire’s understand-
ing of the media is enlightening. He writes that the media detracts from understanding 
by systematically simulating its own understanding of what it represents. Vande Veire 
stresses that, in this way, the media do not deprive us of an original way of understand-
ing or authentic emotion for which we could long for nostalgically. Rather, by present-
ing us with an understandable world, they sever us from the basic human experience of 
ultimate and fundamental incomprehensibility; that which cannot be experienced as 
such and is beyond emotion.42 In the same way, mainstream psychology’s promise of 
complete understanding of oneself and of reconciliation with oneself, others and the 
world, not only suffocates each attempt to understand life in this complex, globalised 
world, but, foremost, it disavows the fundamental and structural failure of understand-
ing. Is it, then, not inevitable that De Kesel’s call for a debate risks falling on deaf ears? 
But before deciding whether or not the debate is possible, let us turn to the third psy-
choanalytic principle: the structural link between the subject and ignorance, the idea of 
truth as “the blind ground upon which knowledge rests.”43  
The Blind Ground of Subjectivity and De-psychologisation  
Mainstream psy-science’s denial of the fundamental and structural failure to be able to 
achieve self-understanding lays bare a central paradox in the contemporary processes 
of psychologization. The aim to unmask (and celebrate) the human being and life as it is 
risks making both humans and life disappear. Contemporary psychology is about genes, 
neurotransmitters and behaviour induced by cognitive or evolutionary patterns; it is 
psychology without the psyche. When that biogenetic paradigm is amended with cogni-
tivebehavioural explanatory mechanisms – supposedly belonging to the realm of the 
psychological – it is only with the proviso that hard science eventually will disclose an 
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underlying biogenetic cause for functioning. But, even where the biogenetic paradigm is 
explicitly rejected in the attempt to salvage psychological man beyond the biological 
substrate, the risk of falling back into a depsychologizing of subjectivity is imminent. 
Žižek, for example, writes that the psychologization of social life – the psychological 
manuals, the Oprah Winfrey style of public confession, politicians disclosing their emo-
tionality – is but “the mask … of its exact opposite, of the growing disintegration of the 
proper “psychological” dimension of authentic self-experience.”44 For Žižek, psycholo-
gization makes humans into automatons, puppets repeating a prerecorded message, in 
other words, depsychologized humans. The paradox is that both biological determinism 
and its counterpart’s attempts to rehumanize man result in a depsychologization. So, 
although Rose speaks about “the waning of psychology” and the birth of the “neuro-
chemical self”45 it is important to see that this depsychologizing and desubjectivizing 
stance was always already an integral part of psychology.  
The social impact of a psychology stripped bare of the mental factor should not be 
underestimated. For example, the so-called attainment targets in the field of education 
(defining what knowledge and skills a pupil should have at a given age), have an impor-
tant psycho-social slant. Assessing such targets in Flanders, Roelands and Druine write, 
“The school is expected to pursue an optimal care system which gives every child 
maximum opportunity of a full and wellbalanced development of their personality.”46 
The attainment targets are saturated with psy-terminology; they refer to social skills, 
assertivity, the ability to speak about emotions (target three- to six-year-olds), and the 
ability to be respectful and tolerant.47 Using these normative psychological models, cur-
rent education is based on the premise that life can be taught. The major consequence is, 
paradoxically, that all the weight shifts from life itself to theoretical instruction. Pupils 
are regarded as students of psychology. Take, for instance, the Box Full of Feelings, 
where educational material encourages children to “analyze the posters and discover 
how emotions are expressed through mimic and posture.”48 Does one not end up here 
with a Class Full of Little Psychologists? Žižek’s depsychologized automaton49 is realised 
through a schooling in psychology. This educational stance parallels the fact that con-
temporary psychotherapy is often reduced to a supplement to medication and becomes 
little more than psycho-education, literally, education in the theories of psychology.  
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 The most clear-cut case of the kind of depsychologized psychology that turns to psy-
cho-education is found in the syndrome called ADHD. Even though ADHD is considered 
to be a medical disorder, it is in no way medically diagnosable. The widespread critique 
of ADHD as a social construct50 notwithstanding, ADHD remains a very powerful fiction 
clearly capable of becoming reality. ADHD owes its prominent position to its being 
grounded in a strong educational discourse. Since the 1980s, when it was ‘voted into 
existence’ as a category of the DSM, 51 massive information and education campaigns to 
inform the public have been successfully implemented by governmental and other 
agencies. It is logical that parents and adults in caring relationships with a child have to 
be educated on the subject of ADHD, for the DSM-diagnosis of ADHD is based on third-
party accounts. Also the aforementioned progressive professionalization of the care-
professions encouraged early-childcare workers, nurses, welfare officers and others to 
become acquainted with a specific way of focusing on the behaviour of children and to 
thus recognize ADHD-related disorders. Even on the level of treatment, the same educa-
tional, de-psychologizing discourse is present:  
Education and advice should be the base of any treatment. One should interview 
parents, child and – ideally – the teacher or nurse, about their health beliefs and 
causal and control attributions; and inform them all about hyperkinetic disorders 
– especially symptoms, aetiology, clinical course, prognosis and treatment. y Chil-
dren who are old enough should be educated about self-observation and self-
management.52  
So, next to the first-line medical treatment, everyone including the child is subjected to 
theory administered by the psy-practioner (with the first and most important lesson 
that ADHD is a disorder with no psychic determination whatsoever). ADHD illustrates 
how the scientism of the human sciences and the unconditional claim, to which De Kesel 
points, for the solidity of its established knowledge53 penetrates not only academic dis-
course but also the whole of society. The knowledge of the mainstream psy-sciences, 
supposed to be emancipating and empowering, is spread through schools, parental 
courses, HRM-departments in companies, governmental campaigns and the media. It is 
important to recognize that, in this respect, it is irrelevant whether or not the widely 
spread theoretical insights of the psy-sciences are correct. What is crucial is that in con-
temporary culture any attempt at understanding oneself and the world is diverted to a 
(de)psychologizing gaze. This totalizing grip of scientism denies any blind spot in the 
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imposed self-reflection and condemns the postmodern subject to the sterile and desub-
jectivised position of the pupil in psychology.  
But – and here we come to the crux of the matter – if psychologization processes 
generate a depsychologised subject, a zero-level of subjectivity, the radical and trou-
bling conclusion cannot but be that in this way the mainstream psy-sciences actually 
realize the very proposition of psychoanalysis. For the psychologised subject is the em-
bodiment of the ignorance or the forgetfulness constitutive of subjectivity. Thus, the 
(de)psychologised subject is the blind ground of the subject of psychoanalysis. But, does 
this not seriously question whether psychoanalysis can be the protagonist that, assess-
ing how serious the situation is, urgently invites the human sciences to a debate?  
Conclusions: A Debate Beyond the Symbiosis  
While scrutinizing De Kesel’s call for a debate on the epistemological assumptions of the 
psy-sciences and psychoanalytic principles, we found in every case that each holds an 
opposite position. To remain within this antagonistic scheme is to be faced with the fol-
lowing problem: how can the alleged misunderstandings of mainstream psychology be 
preferred over the truth of psychoanalysis? In other words, the problem would be pre-
sented as one of understanding that in academia, psy-praxis and the broader culture, 
psychoanalysis seems to have lost ground to problematical neurobiological, cognitive-
behavioural and social constructivist approaches. Psychoanalysis claims to be the sole 
viable alternative to deterministic approaches to subjectivity, but the imagery with 
which its claims are made is the prophet preaching in the desert in vain or a tried and 
condemned Socrates uttering his last public defence for a few last adherents.  
Perhaps we have to understand this image of psychoanalysis as the last man standing 
in yet another way. Maybe psychoanalysis finds itself surrounded by only a few faithful 
because we are dealing here with a Jekyll-and-Hyde constellation. Just as Dr. Jekyll will 
never meet Mr. Hyde, the psychoanalyst cannot but find himself alone in the debate. 
The expected other is not so much the external enemy but, rather, the psychoanalyst’s 
own uncanny double. If, as Erica Burman suggests, psychoanalysis has, in the course of 
history, become the repressed other of psychology,54 then the only way to understand 
the nature of that repression is to question what psychology is for psychoanalysis. This 
question needs to be understood historically. Psychoanalysis is without doubt the first 
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 serious attempt to grasp the psychological subject spawned by modernity.55 This at-
tempt, however, must fail, not because of the idiosyncrasies of Freud or of psychoanaly-
sis, but because the project of modernity itself is paradoxical.  
The Cartesian subject, the subject of modernity, is constituted on the paradox of re-
flexivity. Descartes’s cogito engendered the never-ending sequence of to know that one 
knows that one knows. Cartesianism could in this way never fulfil the promise of an onto-
logical grounding of modern subjectivity. While Descartes and his followers still relied 
on God as the keystone of subjectivity (eg, Malebranche’s occasionalism), a decisive step 
in the history of Western academia was to discard Cartesian dualism and to consider the 
Cartesian soul, the cogito, as being part of res extensa, part of the material world. Man 
thus became Machine Man.56 It can be claimed that from then on every attempt to find an 
agent or subject inside man could lead only to a repetition of reductionisms and deter-
minisms.  
It is exactly this deadlock of modern subjectivity that Freudian theory tried to con-
ceptualize in such concepts as the bedrock of castration, the death drive, polymorphous 
sexuality, and so on. However, one can argue that what is decisive for modernity is the 
disappearance of the juxtaposition of, on one hand, the truth of the Delphi oracle 
(mythical and divine) and, on the other, the riddle of the Sphinx, which teases out hu-
man knowledge and theory. In modernity the gap between truth and knowledge, which 
is what produces the classical subjectivity of the Oedipus figure, moves to other 
grounds. In the Freudian understanding of modern subjectivity, truth is no longer situ-
ated in the mythical and religious realms, but rather in the sphere of the subjective and 
the psychological. Truth here becomes, to use De Kesel’s phrase, the Freudian skan-
dalons.57 René Girard already used the Greek word skandalon (an obstacle that one cannot 
avoid) to understand Freud’s conceptualisation of desire: linked to a particular obstacle, 
desire always return to what it collides with.58 Consider, for example, the Freudian un-
derstanding of repetition and compulsion. These skandalons not only point to the prob-
lematic status of the modern subject, which always escapes and defies itself and never 
reaches full being; they also prevent psychoanalysis – as one of the crucial theories of 
modernity – from reaching full being, from becoming a science or, more precisely, from 
becoming psychology. Moreover, it is this structural failure of psychoanalysis that be-
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came modern psychology’s project to ‘fix’, as the latter engaged in revising and neutral-
izing the psychoanalytic skandalons.  
Thus, it is only through the development of the post-Freudian psy-sciences that the 
full weight of the Freudian elaboration of modern subjectivity comes to light. Or, to put 
it bluntly, the truth that necessarily escapes psychoanalysis can return only in the mis-
understandings of psychology. That is what the repression in the history of the psy-
sciences is about. The positivization of mainstream psy-science shows the force of the 
psychoanalytic view of a fundamental negativity in subjectivity. Hence it is only 
through psychology that psychoanalysis can understand the history of its own impact 
on modern subjectivity and modern society. It is only from here that a critical approach 
to the psy-sciences can escape the deadlock of the search for an authenticity beyond 
psychology. The problem of reflexivity, the Cartesian to know that one knows, lies in the 
supposition that the primal knowing would have sense on its own, while the whole point 
of reflexivity is that this primal knowing is but a mythical, logical construction. There is 
no unmediated or natural way of knowing prior to reflexive knowing. So we should not 
be lured into a search to find out what is really behind the mystifying veils of the psy-
sciences and believe that such a search is what psychoanalysis is about. The question, 
instead, concerns why and how psychology gradually replaced psychoanalysis as a re-
gime of truth, claiming sure knowledge of man and society. The question here does not 
concern the hidden truth behind the mystifications of psychology; the issue is, rather, 
that psychoanalysis, the first real account of modern subjectivity, cannot but be pre-
sented by way of the psychological sciences, a presentation through which psycho-
analysis is deformed and alienated, losing again and again its mysterious core, its hidden 
and fascinating agalma.  
The debate should thus be about the vicissitudes and the deadlocks of the various 
theorizations of modern subjectivity. But it is to be feared that in today’s delimited aca-
demic and cultural domain such a debate will not be possible, as it can be expected that 
there will not be much space made in psychology departments for the nonpsychological 
zero-level of subjectivity of psychoanalysis. It is just this structural deadlock in the debate 
that eventually leads us to disciplines other than the psy-sciences, disciplines more ca-
pable of taking up the position of psychoanalysis’ double (eg, arts, ethics and politics, as 
these are also unmistakeably touched by the inevitable overflow of psychoanalysis). 
This is also De Kesel’s stance: the move to the field of literature and the sciences of lit-
erature.59 But, if I am allowed this final shift, maybe academia might not be the best 
place for this debate, as the nonsubjectivizable, the nonpsychological – as structurally 
beyond the reach of the discourses of science – is also the beyond of academia. It is here 
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 that the terrain of ideology imposes itself as an appropriate domain for psychoanalysis 
to engage in the discussion of grounding principles. For, we have to ask if in the phe-
nomena of psychologization we see the remainders of psychoanalysis surface, that is, to 
use Ian Parker’s words, as “everyday life bloated by media makeover and self-help nos-
trums,”60 why is it that we find ourselves there in the middle of, again in Parker’s words, 
“sticky ideology”?61  
In other words, psychologization as ideological element serves particular political 
agendas and is part and parcel not just of mainstream psychology but of psychoanalysis 
as well. This means that ideology is not just what is added in the presumed watering 
down and distortion of psychoanalysis; it must have been always already there. For, if 
we were to attempt the reverse operation and undo the ways psychoanalysis has been 
distorted, we would find the core of ideology once again. That is, when we regress or try 
to read the symptoms, or lift the veils of repression, we find ourselves back in Freud’s 
turn-of-the-century Vienna, that is, we find ourselves dealing with emergent forms of 
subjectivity related to the birth of a bourgeoisie struggling to do away with the heritage 
of the Ancien Regime – and at the same time adopting some of the old feudal forms of 
social relationships.62 Thus, the ideological entanglements of psychologization do not 
bring us anything new. It is the return of the repressed, which is to be understood in 
Lacanian terms: the message returns inverted; the emancipatory potential of psycho-
analysis (eg, Freud hoped his theory would enlighten human kind) eventually becomes 
in psychologisation a “pervasive sticky ideology.”  
But it is important to see that, even when one chooses the path of ideology and tries 
to do justice to the inevitable political aspect of the theorization of subjectivity, one 
does not escape the psy-discourse. The use of psychoanalytic technical terms, such as 
regression or repression, is not only deliberative, it is also compulsory: there are no other 
signifiers to do the job. If it can be said that psychology proceeds through psychologiza-
tion, perhaps psychoanalysis cannot escape psychologization either. In this way psy-
choanalysis is not the business of depsychologization; psychoanalysis is the discipline 
that takes psychologization as seriously as possible. Hence, clinically speaking, analy-
sands psychologising their situations are not to be met with the nostalgic wish for a 
time when patients were naive in respect to psychological/psychoanalytical knowledge. 
The psychologising is actually the symptom at play; it is the transference at work. Thus 
when ADHD, PTSS, CFS or other abbreviations end up in the office of a psychoanalyst, 
they are finally at the right address. Psychologization is a question within transference 
to psychoanalysis: in psychologization psychoanalysis receives its own message in an 
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inverted form. And that message concerns the modern subject, the subject of the 
Enlightenment, the subject of the sciences, precisely in its status of what is left over 
from the objectivations of science.  
Psychoanalysis does not aim at a depsychologization as such; rather, it envisions the 
subject as existing between psychologization and depsychologization. To unearth or, 
better, to lay bare what is at the very surface, namely, the subject as the surplus of re-
flexivity, is the ethical task of psychoanalysis. It is only there, in the opened up space 
beyond academia, in the field of ideology, that the symbiosis, the deadly folie à deux of 
psychoanalysis and psychology can be broken and the other doubles of psychoanalysis – 
arts, literature, ethics, politics – can be engaged. 
 
